Acts of an Adversary
Russia’s Ongoing Hostilities Toward the United States and Its Allies
By Max Bergmann & Carolyn Kenney
Introduction and summary
Russia’s efforts to attack and undermine American democracy did not begin or end with the 2016 election. Russia’s vast
espionage and cybercapabilities continue to target the United States government, its citizens, as well as America’s
democratic allies around the world.
This report outlines Russia’s continuing hostile actions toward the United States and its allies. It finds that the election of
Donald Trump has not resulted in the Kremlin changing course or reducing its hostile actions toward the United States.
Russia continues to:
-Aggressively target the United States in cyberspace, including its government, businesses, citizens, and interests
-Provide cybercriminals with a safe haven from which they can prey on Americans
-Conduct aggressive espionage campaigns against the United States and its allies, including harassing U.S. diplomats and
assassinating the Kremlin’s adversaries abroad
-Probe ways to attack American infrastructure, especially in the energy, communications, and financial sectors
-Intervene in American elections, politics, and political discourse, often by utilizing social media platforms
-Operate dangerously and provocatively against U.S. and NATO forces
-Occupy territory of a sovereign foreign country in violation of fundamental principles of international law
-Act against U.S. interests worldwide
These are not the actions of an ally; they are the actions of an adversary. The Kremlin has made a strategic determination that
the United States is an adversary—not an ally or partner—of Russia. This is a determination based not on who holds the
White House but rather on what America stands for and represents. The Kremlin has shifted back to a Cold War-footing; has
brushed off and updated much of the playbook of the Soviet Union; and is seeking to undermine democratic states from within.
1 Yet the Russian Federation is not the Soviet Union. Modern Russia is, in fact, comparatively weak economically and has
nowhere near the diplomatic and military clout of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. As a result, Russia operates in a more
insurgent manner, using asymmetric means to undermine the United States, NATO, and the European Union.
Despite Russia’s blatant attack on American democracy during the 2016 election, President Trump and Secretary of State Rex
Tillerson have pursued a policy of appeasement. Throughout his political campaign and first year in office, Trump has never
wavered from bestowing praise on Russian President Vladimir Putin. Trump has repeatedly cast doubt on the intelligence
community’s assessment that the Russian government intervened in the U.S. election. During his recent trip to Asia, Trump
told reporters, “Every time he [Putin] sees me, he says, ‘I didn’t do that,’ and I really believe that when he tells me that.” This
statement, even though the White House tried to walk it back, is incredibly dangerous for the United States. It provides a
significant opening for Russia, as it indicates that the United States now has a president who is inclined to believe Putin, a
former KGB agent, over members of the U.S. intelligence community, who have taken an oath to defend and protect the United
Instead of taking steps to protect America and respond to Russian efforts, President Trump and Secretary of State Tillerson
have sought to establish a strategic alliance with Russia. Trump has suggested the creation of a “cyber security unit” with
Russia, despite Russia serving as a safe haven for cybercriminals. He has also sought to cooperate with Russia on
counterterrorism in Syria, despite Russia’s focus on propping up the regime. What seems lost on the White House is that a
“grand bargain” is in Russia’s interests, not the United States’, as Russia simply has little to offer the United States short of a
dramatically changing its behavior. Russia’s economy is relatively small and sputtering, and its major economic asset, its
vast fossil fuel energy resources, have little strategic interest to the United States, which is now awash in natural gas,
transitioning to more renewable sources of energy, and is benefiting from low global energy prices. While there are some
areas of mutual interest where it is prudent to cooperate with Russia, such as nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, any
broader rapprochement between the United States and Russia should require a dramatic change in the Kremlin’s behavior,
something Russia has not signaled any interest in pursuing and the Trump administration has not even sought.
The White House and secretary of state are also effectively weakening America’s defenses by taking steps that undermine
efforts to oppose Russian aggression, both domestically and abroad. Such steps include the following:
-The Trump administration has sought to remove sanctions related to Russia’s actions in Ukraine
-The president and the secretary of state sought to block and then water down sanctions on Russia
-The secretary of state is deconstructing and downsizing the U.S. Department of State, gutting the ability of U.S. diplomacy to
counter Russian influence
-The president and the secretary of state hosted the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the White House and State
Department just days after Russian interference in the French election
-The secretary of state recently closed the State Department’s office responsible for overseeing and coordinating U.S.
sanctions across various government agencies, even though the administration now has to implement a massive Russian
-The secretary of state has slowed and constrained the ability of the Global Engagement Center to counter Russian influence
operations around the world
-The president and secretary of state, by downplaying support for democracy and human rights, have hobbled efforts to
counter Russian propaganda, especially in Eastern Europe
This weakness in the face of Russian aggression only invites future attacks on America. Former FBI Director James Comey
testified in March 2017 that Russia is not done: “They’ll be back. And they’ll be in 2020, they may be back in 2018 … [T]hey
were successful.” The United States must face the reality that as long as Vladimir Putin is leading Russia, the United States
and Russia will be strategic adversaries.
This summer, with near unanimity, the U.S. congress passed bipartisan Russia sanctions legislation that could impose real
costs on Russia for its interference in the 2016 election. Congress must now make sure that the administration is actually
implementing the sanctions legislation. However, while imposing costs on Russia is essential, Congress also needs to take
action now to protect our democracy from future attacks. Currently, the Republican-controlled Congress has also done little to
protect America from the ongoing threat posed by Russia. Despite Russia’s attack on American democracy, the Republican-
controlled Congress has not called out the White House for its inaction and its efforts to appease the Kremlin. Congress has
passed no legislation to defend the country from future attack. America remains badly exposed, as important legislation to
shore up the security of the election system remains blocked by Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and House
Speaker Paul Ryan (R-WI). The near unanimous support for Russia sanctions legislation shows there is bipartisan support
for action should Congressional leadership allow legislation to come to a vote.
Despite the lack of concern from Congress and the White House, the U.S. military, U.S. diplomats, the intelligence community,
the Department of Justice, the FBI, and many hardworking Americans within U.S. government agencies are taking steps to
address the challenge. It is important to note that the United States therefore also conducts some of the same espionage
practices that Russia is employing and that the United States spies on Russia, just as Russia spies on the United States.
Similar to how the United States sees certain Russian actions as provocative, the Russians also see certain actions by the
United States and its NATO allies as being just as provocative. This is not unusual, especially among countries that approach
each other as adversaries. However, while Russia approaches the United States as an adversary, the inclination from the
White House to appease the Kremlin has meant that there is no coherent policy from the Trump administration toward
Russia. The absence of any U.S. diplomatic energy or direction from the secretary of state means that these agencies are
trying to respond to Russia with one hand tied behind their back, as there is no leadership, no strategy, few resources, and no
priority given to this challenge.
Furthermore, the Trump administration’s incoherence creates a dangerous dynamic. The lack of clarity means the Kremlin
does not know when it has gone too far or crossed the line because no line is drawn and no potential consequences were
articulated. Russian efforts, therefore, have pushed further and further and frequently pushed the boundaries into areas that
could be seen as hostile. Avoiding an escalatory cycle requires drawing clear lines. And while the United States and Russia
need to be ever mindful of falling into an escalatory spiral, that does not mean the United States should seek to appease the
Kremlin and cater to its grudges. The United States must stand up for itself and its allies and re-establish a level of
deterrence with Russia so that Russia knows hostile acts against the United States and allies have consequences.
Reverting to an adversarial relationship with Russia is not an outcome the United States sought. Following the Cold War, U.S.
strategy toward Russia was designed to integrate Russia into Europe and the West; not to recreate a new Cold War dynamic.
While certain U.S. actions after the Cold War may have stoked grievances and fostered a belief in Moscow that the United
States remained an adversary, again and again, through the presidencies of Clinton, Bush, and Obama, the United States
sought to build positive relations with Russia and incorporate it into the international community. But while the U.S. sought to
turn the page on the Cold War, Russia, under Putin, did not. Under Putin, Russia has more than just rejected these
overtures—it has actively sought to undermine the United States, liberal democracy, and European unity.
This report seeks to outline the breadth of Russian efforts to undermine and compromise the United States. This
documentation is not intended to be comprehensive. Instead, it is meant to be illustrative of the ways in which Russia is
continuing to meddle, undermine, and attack the United States and its allies. While Russian efforts never shifted their focus
from the United States after the Cold War, there was a clear shift in focus in the United States away from Russia and toward
counterterrorism, the Middle East, and, now, China and Asia.9 As this report will demonstrate, Russia’s efforts to undermine
the United States its allies are extensive, and to respond, the United States must shift its focus back toward countering the
threat that Russia poses.
Russia is aggressively attacking and spying on the United States in cyberspace
A key theater for Russia’s efforts against the United States is in cyberspace. Russia’s attack on the election in the 2016 was,
according to a U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the FBI’s joint assessment in December:
… part of an ongoing [Russian Intelligence Services] campaign of cyber-enabled operations directed at the U.S. government
and its citizens. These cyber operations have included spear-phishing campaigns targeting government organizations, critical
infrastructure entities, think tanks, universities, political organizations, and corporations leading to the theft of information.
Russia attacked U.S. election infrastructure in 2016
Russian efforts to interfere in the U.S. election system were much more extensive than previously believed. As Sen. Richard
Burr (R-NC), the chair of the Senate intelligence committee, said on June 21, 2017, “There’s no question that Russia carried
out attacks on state election systems.” Bloomberg reported on June 13, 2017, that “Russia’s cyberattack on the U.S. electoral
system before Donald Trump’s election was far more widespread than has been publicly revealed, including incursions into
voter databases and software systems in almost twice as many states as previously reported.” In all, according to Bloomberg’
s sources, “Russian hackers hit systems in 39 states,” while the DHS disclosed that at least 21 states were targeted.
At the time, these attacks were so concerning that the Obama administration used a modern-day “red phone” to confront
Moscow about its attacks in October.13 Nevertheless, after the election, President Barack Obama assured the nation in a
press conference in December that, “[W]e did not see further tampering of the election process.”14 It is now apparent that that
this was not correct; Russian efforts continued to Election Day.
Indeed, much of what the intelligence community is learning about the Russian attacks on our election system was not
caught at the time but, instead, is being learned well-after. At a Senate intelligence committee hearing in June, it was revealed
by Bill Priestap, the assistant director of the Counterintelligence Division of the FBI, that the FBI now has “a number of
investigations open” and are “all still pending … [W]e continue to learn things” about what happened. On June 5, 2017, The
Intercept published a top-secret report from the National Security Agency (NSA) that provided a window into Russia’s efforts.
15 The report was based on intelligence learned in April 2017, well-after the election and Obama’s statement. The
intelligence revealed that:
Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate actors … executed cyber espionage operations against a named U.S.
company in August 2016, evidently to obtain information on elections-related software and hardware solution … The actors
likely used data obtained from that operation to … launch a voter registration-themed spear-phishing campaign targeting U.S.
local government organizations … In October 2016, the actors also created a new email address that was potentially used to
offer election-related products and services, presumably to U.S.-based targets.
The Intercept summarized that, “As described by the classified NSA report, the Russian plan was simple: pose as an e-voting
vendor and trick local government employees into opening Microsoft Word documents invisibly tainted with potent malware
that could give hackers full control over the infected computers.” The Russians therefore did not stop their efforts to interfere in
the election system as President Obama believed they would. The attack effort outlined by the NSA document is just one
incident that we have learned about. As Joe Hall, chief technologist at the Center for Democracy and Technology, explained, “If
it was a dedicated campaign by the GRU, they’re not going to settle for attacking one podunk vendor, they’ll try many different
Bloomberg further revealed, “In Illinois, investigators found evidence that cyberintruders tried to delete or alter voter data.” Mark
Graff, former chief cybersecurity officer at Lawrence Livermore National Lab, told The Intercept that this could be “effectively a
denial of service attack” against potential voters. Furthermore, as Vox’s Timothy Lee concluded, “[G]aining access to voter
registration systems could be a first step to hacking voting machines themselves.” Experts have also long warned that our
election system is extremely vulnerable to cyberattack. As J. Alex Halderman, a professor of computer science and an election
security expert at the University of Michigan, noted in his prepared testimony before the Senate intelligence committee in June,
“Cybersecurity experts have … found severe vulnerabilities that would allow attackers to sabotage machines and to alter
votes. That’s why there is overwhelming consensus in the cybersecurity and election integrity research communities that our
elections are at risk.”
Russia provides a haven for cybercriminals to prey on Americans
Russia serves as a haven for cybercrime against the West. According to a senior British intelligence official in an interview
with the Financial Times, Moscow has “fostered a network of ‘modern privateers,’” effectively emulating state-sanctioned
piracy of centuries ago, where monarchs greenlit pirates to plunder foreign ships. Another U.S. intelligence official told the
Financial Times that “the links between Russia’s state agencies and criminal networks when it comes to aggressive cyber
activities are deep and developing.” These criminal cyberactors are essentially allowed to operate unimpeded if they confine
their criminal efforts outside Russia and serve the needs of the Kremlin when called upon. Moreover, these private hackers
also give the Kremlin additional cyberfirepower and the ability to surge its efforts when needed. According to Brandon
Valeriano, a researcher at the Marine Corps University, “Russia has complete control over their cyberspace … and they’re
perfectly happy to let [hackers] continue their criminal exercises as long as they’re able to work for the state even part time.”
The FBI’s Most Wanted cybercriminal lives with impunity in Russia
The FBI has a $3 million bounty for the capture of Evgeniy Bogachev, but he lives openly in the Russian Black Sea resort town
of Anapa. He is alleged to have created, according to The New York Times, “a sprawling network of virus-infected computers
to siphon hundreds of millions of dollars from bank accounts around the world, targeting anyone with enough money worth
stealing — from a pest control company in North Carolina to a police department in Massachusetts to a Native American tribe
in Washington.” He also, as Wired summarized, created “the digital underground’s malware of choice—the Microsoft Office of
online fraud.” While Bogachev was after money, Russian intelligence was able to piggyback off Bogachev’s efforts and search
the same computers he had accessed for information. Austin Berglas, former assistant special agent in charge of
cyberinvestigations at the FBI, explained that hackers such as Bogachev are “moonlighters … doing the bidding of Russian
intelligence services, whether economic espionage or straight-up espionage.”
Russian intelligence and cybercriminals were behind the hack of Yahoo
In March 2017, the Department of Justice indicted four Russian nationals, including two Russian intelligence officers, for
hacking into Yahoo’s systems. This was the first time the United States has indicted Russian government officials. They
sought “to steal information from about at least (sic) 500 million Yahoo accounts and then used some of that stolen
information to obtain unauthorized access to the contents of accounts at Yahoo, Google and other webmail providers,
including accounts of Russian journalists, U.S. and Russian government officials and private-sector employees of financial,
transportation and other companies.” U.S. law enforcement had initially indicted the suspected Russian hacker, Alexsey
Belan, in 2012, but he escaped to Russia. Instead of handing him over to face trial in the United States, Russian intelligence
used him for the hack into Yahoo. In 2014, The Daily Beast explained, “The hack had a substantial economic impact. Verizon
ended up paying $350 million less to purchase Yahoo than it initially offered because the hack damaged its brand so much.”
The indictment outlines that in addition to diplomatic targets, the Russian hackers got into accounts of a Nevada gaming
official, a senior officer at a major U.S. airline, and an employee at a U.S. financial institution, among others.
A slew of Russian cybercriminals nabbed on vacation
Because Russia shields Russian cybercriminals, the Department of Justice has made a point of targeting Russian
cybercriminals when they leave Russia. Between 2010 and 2016, an average of two Russian cybercriminals were extradited
to the United States each year. As of this past August, the United States had arrested or indicted seven Russians for alleged
U.S. cybercrimes in 2017 alone, marking a record high. These include:
-Pyotr Levashov, allegedly “[o]ne of the world’s most notorious criminal spammers,” who created a series of botnets that
enabled him to send more than one billion emails per day. He was arrested in Spain and is awaiting extradition.
-Evgeny Nikulin, who is accused of hacking into LinkedIn and Dropbox, affecting tens of millions of users. He was arrested in
Prague and is awaiting extradition.
-Alexander Vinnik, who is alleged to have “helped to launder criminal proceeds from syndicates around the world” by creating
a bitcoin exchange. He was arrested in Greece, and a Greek court recently cleared him for extradition to the United States
where he will be brought to trial.
-Yury Martyshev, who allegedly ran a “counter antivirus service” where cybercriminals could test the malware they developed.
He was arrested and extradited from Latvia and is awaiting trial in Virginia.
-Stanislav Lisov, who is alleged to have stolen information on bank clients, resulting in nearly $1 million in losses in the
United States. He was arrested at the Barcelona airport and is awaiting extradition.
Kremlin uses Russian private sector firms to infiltrate U.S. government systems
In October, The Wall Street Journal reported that the Russian government had stolen highly classified details from an NSA
contractor’s home computer. The stolen information included details on how the United States protects itself from
cyberattacks and how they access foreign computer networks. It appears that hackers were able to target the files via the
contractor’s use of antivirus software made by the Russian cybersecurity firm Kaspersky Lab. According to the Journal, the
breach occurred in 2015 but was not discovered until the spring of 2016. Shortly before this report, the DHS had ordered that
all software made by Kaspersky Lab be removed from government computer systems amid growing concerns that the
company might have ties to Russian intelligence agencies—ties the FBI has long been trying to uncover and that Kaspersky
denies. The New York Times also reported that Israeli intelligence officers discovered Russian government hackers using
Kaspersky Lab antivirus software around the world as an “improvised search tool” to hunt for classified U.S. government
programs. Their antivirus software is used by 400 million people globally, including, until recently, by the U.S. Departments of
State, Defense, Energy, Justice, and Treasury, as well as the Army, Navy, and Air Force. As the Center for Strategic and
International Studies outlined in its 2016 report, the “Kremlin Playbook,” Moscow frequently uses Russian businesses and its
network of oligarchs, whose vast wealth is largely preserved by their submission to the Kremlin, to infiltrate and influence
Russia hacked the Olympics
Following the Summer Olympics in Rio de Janeiro last year, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) confirmed that it had been
hacked and confidential information on more than 40 Olympic athletes was revealed. The same hackers who targeted the
Democratic National Committee (DNC), the Russian hacking group APT28—also known as Fancy Bear or Pawn Storm—
claimed responsibility for the hack. They are believed to be part of the GRU, the military intelligence agency of the Kremlin.
They selectively released the private medical information of American athletes, such as gold medal gymnast Simone Biles,
who has ADHD. These hacks were seen as retaliation against WADA, which had recommended banning all Russian athletes
from the Olympics in Rio after it was revealed that Russia conducted a massive state-sponsored doping campaign during the
Sochi Winter Olympics. WADA just ruled that Russia failed to take steps to address doping and remains “non-compliant” with
its standards. The International Olympic Committee will decide whether to ban Russian athletes from the 2018 Winter
Olympics in South Korea at a meeting in December.
Russia’s continuing espionage efforts against the United States
Russia is expanding its effort to recruit spies and agents of influence in the United States. In a report on Russian espionage,
Politico assessed, “After neglecting the Russian threat for a decade, the U.S. was caught flat-footed by Moscow’s election
operation. Now, officials are scrambling to figure out how to contain a sophisticated intelligence network that’s festered and
strengthened at home after years’ worth of inattention … U.S. intelligence officials say Moscow’s espionage ground game is
growing stronger and more brazen than ever.”
Russia is engaged in an aggressive cyberespionage campaign against the U.S. Government
Russia has prioritized the United States as a top espionage target, devoting considerable resources to spying on the United
States. While it is no surprise that Russia and the United States spy on each other, the Kremlin’s actions clearly demonstrate
that Russia does not see the United States in any way as a partner.
Russia targeting the U.S. intelligence community
A major priority for Russian intelligence is countering the efforts of U.S. intelligence. American officials suspect Russia of
being linked to a number of recent high-profile security breaches, according to The New York Times. For instance, Russia is
the prime suspect behind the hacking and exfiltration of a trove of documents from the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA)
Center for Cyber Intelligence. The documents were published by WikiLeaks and exposed a vast array of the CIA’s hacking
techniques and capabilities. The NSA experienced a massive security breach by a group known as the “shadow brokers,”
which released top secret NSA code that it developed for offensive cyberattack operations. The release of this code is
suspected of providing the basis for the recent spate of ransomware attacks. While it remains unknown who was behind the
security breech, The New York Times reported that “American officials strong belief is that it is a Russian operation.”
Russia targeting U.S. military forces
As documented in a Politico investigation, Russian state actors have targeted U.S. service members on Facebook to gather
intelligence and have targeted Pentagon-employee Twitter accounts with phishing attacks. Russia also reportedly targeted
the personal smart phones of deployed NATO forces. They are attempting to acquire sensitive information, such as force
numbers and personal information about these forces, and potentially have the ability to sow confusion in a crisis by sending
out fake orders or information. Russia is seeking “to hobble the ability of the [U.S.] armed forces to clearly assess Putin’s
intentions and effectively counter future Russian aggression.”
Russia targeting U.S. diplomacy
In November 2014, Russian hackers breached the State Department’s unclassified computer system in what former NSA
Deputy Director Richard Ledgett recently described as “hand-to-hand combat” and a “new level of interaction between a
cyberattacker and a defender.”
Russia using the internet to compromise and recruit agents of influence in the United States
As noted in the CAP report “War by Other Means,” what makes the new online information landscape so troubling is that
Russia has been able to expand its espionage efforts against the United States with little consequence.50 Before the internet
and social media, cultivating intelligence assets in the United States largely had to be done in person and was therefore more
difficult and incredibly risky. This forced Soviet and Russian intelligence to be highly selective with their efforts. But now,
Russian intelligence can target Americans en masse and can do so with impunity from thousands of miles away. Once
compromising information—what the Russians call kompromat—is obtained, Russian intelligence agents can use this as
leverage over individuals.
Russia intelligence targets sent malicious links through social media. Citing information from the cybersecurity firm
SecureWorks, security studies Professor Thomas Rid found that, in a period of 14 months, the GRU sent “19,300 malicious
links, targeting around 6,730 individuals.” For Russia, this likely yielded a trove of information that it can deploy to influence
events, attack its enemies, extract financial or business data, shape public opinion, and potentially blackmail and recruit
Russia creates fake and anonymous online honeypots. A common intelligence tactic to gain leverage over an intelligence
target is to seek to capture them in a sexually compromising situation. Andrew Weisburd, J.M. Berger, and Clint Watts, explain,
“In addition to phishing and cracking attacks, these hackers are aided by honeypots, a Cold War term of art referring to an
espionage operative who sexually seduced or compromised targets. Today’s honeypots … often appear as friends on social
media sites, sending direct messages to their targets to lower their defenses through social engineering. After winning trust,
honeypots have been observed … attempting to compromise the target with sexual exchanges, and most perilously, inducing
targets to click on malicious links or download attachments infected with malware.”
Russia used hotel Wi-Fi to spy on guests. In August, the security firm FireEye released a report detailing a Russian
espionage campaign believed to be carried out by the group APT28. It utilized hotel Wi-Fi networks in at least eight countries
in Europe and the Middle East in order to spy on guests and gain access to personal data.53 As summarized in Wired, APT28
utilized a new technique to gain access to guest information that “doesn’t even require users to actively type” their credentials
“when signed onto the hotel network.”
Russia’s escalating harassment of U.S. diplomats
Russian harassment and surveillance of diplomatic staff increased significantly following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in
2014. Russian security services are suspected of breaking into the homes of American diplomats in Russia, slashing tires,
and even reportedly killing the U.S. defense attaché’s dog. Furthermore, in June 2016, a U.S. intelligence officer working in the
U.S. embassy in Moscow was brutally assaulted outside the embassy after having lost his Russian tail. His shoulder was
broken and he was evacuated from the embassy. Former CIA Director John Brennan told Congress in May 2017 that “the
continued mistreatment and harassment of U.S. diplomats was intolerable.” As The Washington Post reported in 2016,
Russian intelligence and security services “have been waging a campaign of harassment and intimidation against U.S.
diplomats, embassy staff, and their families in Moscow” and across Europe. This prompted former Secretary of State John
Kerry to ask Putin directly to put an end to the behavior and resulted in the June 2016 eviction of two Russians from the United
States. However, a U.S. intelligence official told Politico, “They are far more aggressive on counterintelligence issues in
Russia than we are here.”
Russia suspected of assassinating enemies abroad, including in the United States
Over the past decade, there have been a series of mysterious deaths in the United Kingdom and in the United States. Since
the 2016 U.S. election, at least seven Russian diplomats, a senior former intelligence official, and a dissident politician in
Ukraine have been killed. Some were murdered, while some appeared to die of natural causes—both in mysterious
circumstances and some not. As former FBI agent Clint Watts told the Senate intelligence committee in March, “[F]ollow the
trail of dead Russians.” As Watts explained, “[I]f you look over the past year, really year and a half, you’ve seen a string of
senior Russian officials that have died, some of them obviously of natural causes but some of them under suspicious
U.S. Intelligence agencies link 14 suspicious deaths in the United Kingdom to Russia. In a blockbuster five-part series, a
BuzzFeed investigation uncovered a string of mysterious deaths in the United Kingdom. Its investigation concluded that
Russia assassinated its enemies, including Russian dissidents and emigres, but also a British journalist as well as a U.K.
intelligence official, whose body was found in a North Face bag in his bathtub. BuzzFeed assessed, “The story of this ring of
death illuminates one of the most disturbing geopolitical trends of our time—the use of assassinations by Russia’s secret
services and powerful mafia groups to wipe out opponents around the globe—and the failure of British authorities to confront
it … The intelligence pointing to a campaign of targeted killings in Britain comes amid mounting international concern that the
Kremlin is brazenly interfering in the West.”
FBI agents reportedly believe Russia behind an assassination in Washington, D.C., hotel. BuzzFeed discovered that “Vladimir
Putin’s former media czar was murdered in Washington, D.C., on the eve of a planned meeting with the U.S. Justice
Department, according to two FBI agents … Mikhail Lesin’s battered body was discovered in his Dupont Circle [Washington,
D.C.] hotel room on the morning of Nov. 5, 2015, with blunt-force injuries to the head, neck, and torso.” The death was
deemed an accident, but BuzzFeed reports that “two FBI agents—as well as a third agent and a serving US intelligence
officer—said Lesin was actually bludgeoned to death … ‘Lesin was beaten to death … there isn’t a single person inside the
bureau who believes this guy got drunk, fell down, and died. Everyone thinks he was whacked and that Putin or the Kremlin
were behind it.’
Murdering an individual in the United States is not acceptable and would represent a significant escalation in Russian hostility
against the United States.
Russian organized crime is used as a tool of the Kremlin
Just as Russian hackers are often used as tools of the Russian state, so are Russian organized criminals. Mark Galeotti of
the Institute of International Relations Prague explains in Foreign Policy, “[Russia is] increasingly turning to organized crime
groups as proxies, intelligence assets, and sometimes even as hired killers. Welcome to the modern age of hybrid war, when
even crime has been weaponized.” In a report for the European Council on Foreign Relations, Galeotti explains further that
there is “growing evidence of connections between such [Russian-based] criminal networks and the Kremlin’s state security
apparatus, notably the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), military intelligence (GRU), and the Federal Security Service (FSB)
… We are seeing more and more cases, especially in Europe, where local counterintelligence services believe gangsters are
acting as occasional Russian assets. Some work on behalf of the Russia state willingly. In other cases, these criminals have
been turned into assets without their knowledge, thinking they are simply doing a service for a Russian gang. And yet for
others, they are made an offer they can’t refuse.” Brian Whitmore, a Russia-watcher for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
notes, “Moscow relied heavily on local organized crime structures in its support for separatist movements in Transdniester,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Donbas.”
Russia has also provided a safe haven for Russian organized crime bosses. For instance, in April 2013, an FBI investigation
led to the indictment of more than 30 people—including a man who ABC News described as “one of the world’s most
notorious Russian mafia bosses,” Alimzhan Tokhtakhounov—for allegedly operating a criminal gambling and money
laundering operation out of unit 63A in Trump Tower, just three floors below Donald Trump’s residence.66 Tokhtakhounov
was the only one to escape, prompting Interpol to issue a “red notice” for his arrest. Yet, seven months later, Tokhtakhounov
was photographed on the red carpet at Trump’s 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow.
ProPublica conducted an extensive report on Spain’s efforts to counter Russian organized crime. It found, “The mafias’ ties to
the Russian government, and particularly to the security services, have led Spanish officials to fear for their national security
as well as law and order.”68 A senior Spanish police official told ProPublica, “[T]here is always the shadow of intelligence
services behind [Russian] organized crime.” Spain found that Russian organized criminal groups were connected “to
murders, kidnapping, extortion, robbery and drug and arms trafficking.” According to court documents reviewed by ProPublica,
one key crime boss, Gennady Petrov, was even connected to the alleged black-market sales of Russian military helicopters
and MiG fighter jets to Africa. Furthermore, the Spanish police recorded intercepts of “Petrov’s contacts with a Russian deputy
prime minister and at least five other cabinet ministers, as well as legislators, oligarchs and bankers, investigative
documents show. And his influence was remarkably steady, given the volatility of the Putin regime.” Petrov has denied the
charges against him. As Galeotti assessed, “[O]rganised crime groups … are likely to become an even greater problem as
Russian’s campaign to undermine Western unity and effectiveness continues.”
Russia is probing ways to attack America
As Russia’s economy boomed from high energy prices, Russia significantly increased investments to modernize its military.
But understanding its weakened military position relative to the Soviet Union’s position with the United States, Russia has
sought to find asymmetric ways of attacking America that could level the military playing field. Russia is probing critical U.S.
infrastructure and examining ways in which it could strike at it. Most recently, Ciaran Martin, the head of the U.K. Cyber Security
Centre, disclosed that Russian hackers had conducted “attacks on the UK media, telecommunications and energy sectors.”
70 While much of this espionage is not unusual for adversaries, it also signals that Russia is looking for nonkinetic ways to
potentially retaliate against the United States and its allies that fall short of escalating toward a military conflict.
Russia is targeting U.S. nuclear power plants
At the end of June, the FBI and DHS issued a joint report to industrial firms disclosing a series of hacking attempts—some of
which were successful—targeted at the nuclear and energy sectors, including at least one on a nuclear power plant in
Kansas.71 The report concluded that “hackers appeared determined to map out computer networks for future attacks.”
According to U.S. government officials, Russian government hackers were responsible. The Russian hackers had gained
access to the business networks of U.S. nuclear power companies. While they were not able to breach the operations
systems controlling the power plants, as The Washington Post noted, the attacks “could be a sign that Russia is seeking to
lay the groundwork for more damaging hacks.”74 These latest attacks are not the first time the Russian government has
targeted U.S. infrastructure either: In 2014, they conducted a similar campaign targeting U.S. industrial control systems.
These kinds of attacks are not confined to the U.S.; the same hackers have also targeted similar energy systems in Ireland
and Turkey and were responsible for the most recent attack on Ukraine’s energy system which “briefly shut down one-fifth of
the electric power generated in Kiev.”
Russia is targeting the U.S. financial sector
Following the imposition of sanctions against Russia for its illegal occupation of Crimea, Russia is suspected of retaliating
against the U.S. financial industry by hacking into JPMorgan Chase and another U.S. bank. In 2014, the FBI arrested a
Russian spy ring in New York. One of the Russian agents, was operating under cover as an employee of Vnesheconombank,
a sanctioned Russian bank. According to the FBI’s indictment, these Russian intelligence figures sought information on high-
frequency trading systems. In 2010, the Nasdaq stock exchange discovered a malicious cyberattack code, and Russia was
seen as the likely culprit. According to Wired, in 2014, the Warsaw Stock Exchange was hacked by a Russian group false-
flagging as “cyber-jihadists. Cameron Colquhoun of the firm Neon Century wrote in Wired, “The erroneous and uncontrollable
behaviour of trading algorithms—known as flash crashes—are regular occurrences in many stock markets. Critically, there
are few human stockbrokers left, leaving the financial world with no backup if the markets were manipulated or wiped.”
Russia is targeting U.S. communication infrastructure
One way Russia could significantly retaliate against the United States is to take down U.S. communications networks and
infrastructure. Nearly every aspect of U.S. society—its economy, its energy and power sectors, its military—is dependent on
the viability of the communications network, which would make such an attack devastating.
Russian operatives targeting U.S. fiber-optic cables and telecommunications infrastructure
Politico described U.S. officials seeing an increase in alarming behavior in the United States throughout 2016 on the part of
Russian diplomats who are “widely assumed to be intelligence operatives.”82 Russian diplomats, whose travel is closely
monitored by the State Department, repeatedly went missing for periods of time, often ending up in seemingly random places
in the United States. Some were found “to be lingering where underground fiber-optic cables tend to run,” and others were
found driving in circles. This behavior “has led intelligence officials to conclude that the Kremlin is waging a quiet effort to map
the United States’ telecommunications infrastructure, perhaps preparing for an opportunity to disrupt it.” Additionally, The New
York Times reported in 2015 that U.S. officials fear that, in the midst of a conflict, Russia may try to sever undersea cables at
the hardest to reach areas deep in the ocean.
U.S. satellite and communication systems are targets
As the director of National Intelligence, Dan Coats testified in May before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that
Russia would seek to “offset any U.S. military advantage from … space systems and are increasing increasingly considering
attacks against satellite systems as part of their future warfare doctrine.”
Russia is testing and working to undermine our ability to respond to disasters
On September 11, 2014, the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness for St. Mary Parish, Louisiana,
received reports that there had been a chemical plant explosion in Centerville, Louisiana. News of the alleged explosion
spread across Twitter, with hundreds of users documenting what appeared to be eyewitness accounts and videos of the
explosion and one user even posting a screenshot of CNN’s homepage reporting on the story. According to one YouTube
video, the Islamic State took credit for the attack. In the end, however, the entire incident proved to be an extremely well-
coordinated hoax by the Kremlin-connected Internet Research Agency, which involved not only the use of dozens of fake
Twitter accounts but also the creation of clone news sites, a Wikipedia page documenting the explosion, and a fake YouTube
video.85 These complex efforts are designed to sow public distrust of the U.S. media and U.S. government institutions.
Russia continues to intervene in American politics
Russia did not stop its aggressive intervention in American politics after the 2016 election. Russia continues to wage an
aggressive influence campaign, utilizing U.S. social media platforms and troll farms as well as Russian-media news outlets.
As Ben Nimmo of the Digital Forensics Lab of the Atlantic Council assessed, “They [the Russians] haven’t stood still since
2016.”86 Laura Rosenberger of the German Marshall Fund observed, Russia is “potentially laying the groundwork for what
they’re going to do in 2018 and 2020.”
Russian troll farms are still at work
In December, the now infamous Internet Research Agency reportedly shut its doors. But CAPAF’s Moscow Project uncovered
through analyzing Russian corporate records that it likely has reformed under a new name: Glavset. CAPAF’s Diana Pilipenko
told Wired, “It’s there … It’s alive and well and operating.”88 She added, “If Facebook has only identified ads purchased by
one of these companies, there needs to be an immediate investigation into activity by everything in this ‘Kremlebot’ empire …
This may just be the tip of the iceberg.”
Russia continues to operate fraudulent accounts on U.S. social media platforms
ThinkProgress examined accounts identified by Twitter as fraudulent and found that “the accounts in question reveal that at
least three of the suspended, Russia-linked Twitter accounts link back to multiple Facebook pages—pages that remain live
even after last week’s congressional hearings.” As Andrew Weisburd and Brett Schafer of the German Marshall Fund’s
Hamilton 68 project assess, “No longer is advanced tradecraft required to execute a successful influence operation; now,
basic cultural and linguistic skills, along with an understanding of trending algorithms, is all that is needed for Kremlin-
oriented accounts to insinuate themselves into more organic social networks, including in the United States.”
Bots continue to amplify and harass
A report from the Virginia Education Association found that, during the Virginia gubernatorial election, bots were amplifying a
controversy over an advertisement. Timothy Chambers, one of the researchers of the report, told The Washington Post, “We
are seeing the same exact techniques that attempted to skew the social media conversation and affect hashtags trending and
search results that we saw in the [presidential] election.”91 Bloomberg reported that a “pro-Kremlin cyborg site … averages a
rate of more than 220 tweets a day, including memes about McCain in the week after the Charlottesville unrest.”
Kremlin pushing anti-American conspiracy theories
Russia released a video in November 2017 that it claimed proved that American forces in Syria were allowing Islamic State
fighters to escape from surrounded cities. It was later revealed that the Russian video was a fake. Moscow was using images
from a video game trailer and clips from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. As The Washington Post’s Christian Caryl assessed,
“[This] is but one example of how Moscow’s state-sponsored lie machine keeps cruising along even as its operations are
being unveiled.” The spokeswoman for the Russian foreign ministry, Maria Zakharova, even claimed that a fake photograph of
Osama bin Laden being hosted at the White House was true. Putin himself pushed conspiracy theories that the United States
is preparing for biological warfare, saying that the United States has been collecting tissue samples of Russians, asking
“Why are they going to different ethnic groups and to people living in different geographical locations across Russia?” Adding,
“why are they doing this?”
Russia seeking to sow division; stoke the far right
The German Marshall Fund’s Hamilton 68 project has highlighted the continuing efforts of Russia to influence American
politics on Twitter. Highlighting the themes of Russian influence operations on Twitter, they note that the Russians are heavily
enmeshed in supporting the alt-right. On November 6, they assessed, “Between October 21 and November 3, we examined
121 unique articles that were among the top URLs shared by Kremlin-oriented Twitter accounts. Of those URLs, 30 percent
were anti-Hillary Clinton, 11 percent were anti-Robert Mueller, 7 percent were anti-Barack Obama, and 4 percent were anti-
Tony Podesta (several URLs attacked a combination of or all of the above figures).”95 Kremlin-messaging is heavily
symbiotic with much of the alt-right messaging.
Russia continues to use its official media outlets, such as RT and Sputnik, to amplify stories and launder fake information
RT and Sputnik clearly serve as propaganda arms of the Russian state and have, therefore, been required to register as
foreign agents under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA); Russia has said it will challenge the decision in court.96 RT
uses the tagline “Question More” to justify pushing conspiracy theories and sowing doubt in Western state institutions.
Because Russia does not have a domestic partisan agenda, it eagerly highlights voices on both ends of the political
spectrum—as long as they are critical of Western governments. For instance, RT has hired prominent progressives, such as
Ed Schultz, and had Green Party candidate Jill Stein seated at the same table at the RT gala as Michael Flynn, President
Trump’s short-lived national security adviser.97 RT and Sputnik’s willingness to selectively highlight critical voices on the right
and the left also adds to the credibility of these organizations on both sides of the political spectrum, which enhances the
ability of RT and Sputnik to push disinformation.
Russia aggressively intervened in European elections in 2017
Russia seeks to sow doubt and discredit the American and European democratic systems and, to do so, it seeks to amplify
fringe and extremist views that often cast doubt on democratic institutions or espouse conspiracy theories. Russia extensively
intervened in European elections throughout 2017.
Germany: During the German elections in September, Russia amplified anti-immigrant sentiment and amplified messages
favorable to the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), which had its best ever showing. In 2015, Russia also hacked into and
stole data from the German Bundestag.
France: Russia hacked the campaign of Emmanuel Macron and attempted to leak damaging information just a few days
before the election. Russia reportedly financed the campaign of Marine Le Pen of the far-right National Front, who met with
Putin in Moscow just a month before the French election.
The Netherlands: Russian disinformation and propaganda arms heavily targeted the Netherlands before the March election,
spreading fake news and amplifying anti-immigrant sentiments.
Russia provides backing to secessionists in European Union and United States
As part of their efforts to undermine the European Union, as well as the United States, Russia has been supporting
secessionist movements. Some of these movements have genuine local support; others are clearly manufactured efforts.
Catalan independence: On November 10, the Spanish government confirmed that Russian hackers had been interfering in
the crisis in Catalonia. The Spanish defense minister, María Dolores de Cospedal, revealed, “The government has
corroborated the fact that many messages and operations that were seen via social networks come from Russian territory.”
Russia supports fringe secessionist movements in the United States, such as the Texas Nationalist Movement and Yes
California. The purported leader of Yes California actually lives in Russia and opened an “embassy” in Moscow.103 Politico
also reported that Russia has also sought to amplify Texan secessionists, bringing them to a far-right conference in Russia
and using RT, Sputnik, and Russian-linked bots to amplify their reach.
Russia providing backing to extremist European political parties and groups
As detailed extensively in CAP report “Russia’s 5th Column,” Russia has been providing support to far-right parties across
Europe.105 Such support has come in various forms, ranging from “elevating the profile of European far-right leaders to
disinformation, propaganda, alleged illicit financing, and covert influence operations.” In exchange, these parties have
provided Russia with international support and have undertaken actions favorable to Russia’s objectives, such as supporting
the lifting of sanctions against Russia and blaming the European Union and NATO for the crisis in Ukraine.
Russia undermining international law and treaties
Russia has violated key tenets of international law through its military invasions and annexation of neighboring countries,
including Georgia and Ukraine. Russia is also not in compliance with a key arms control treaty.
Russia violated international law and its treaty commitments by illegally seizing and occupying Ukrainian territory
Since 2014, Ukraine and Russia have been in a de facto war, as Russia illegally occupied and seized the Ukrainian territory of
Crimea and initiated a separatist war using proxies in eastern Ukraine. As a result, Ukraine has borne the brunt of Russia’s
cyber and espionage capabilities. This is a violation of the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. Russia broke a key
principle of post-World War II international order—that stronger powers will not seize territory and redraw borders. It is also a
clear violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Russia pledged to “to respect the independence and sovereignty
and the existing borders of Ukraine.”
Russia engaged in a proxy war in eastern Ukraine
Russia is waging a separatist war to undercut the new Ukrainian government. Russia established a proxy force in eastern
Ukraine—arming, funding, and manning these forces. In summer 2014, when the Ukrainian military was routing these forces,
Russia invaded eastern Ukraine with its regular forces and drove back the Ukrainian military. Russia’s proxy forces are also
responsible for the downing of MH17, killing 270 passengers.
Ukraine a Russian “test lab for cyberwar”
As Wired described it, Ukraine has been “Russia’s test lab for cyberwar.” In December 2015 and 2016, Russian-connected
hackers are alleged to have twice caused blackouts to a quarter of a million Ukrainians in the middle of the Ukrainian winter.
In December 2016, Ukraine’s president Petro Poroshenko announced that, in just the previous two months, there had been
6,500 cyberattacks against 36 Ukrainian targets. As Wired assessed, the “digital blitzkrieg that has pummeled Ukraine for the
past three years … [is] a sustained cyber assault unlike any the world has ever seen. A hacker army has systematically
undermined practically every sector of Ukraine: media, finance, transportation, military, politics, energy. Wave after wave of
intrusions have deleted data, destroyed computers, and in some cases paralyzed organizations’ most basic functions.” As
John Hultquist of cybersecurity firm FireEye concluded, “We’ve seen this actor show a capability to turn out the lights and an
interest in U.S. systems.”
Russia likely behind a slew of assassinations and terrorist bombings in Ukraine
Ukraine has been rocked by a continuous wave of assassinations. These include a slew of bombings and shootings,
sometimes in broad daylight, targeting Russian dissident politicians, Ukrainian military officers, and political figures.
Human rights abuses in Crimea
A U.N. human rights report found “grave human rights violations, such as arbitrary arrests and detentions, enforced
disappearances, ill-treatment and torture, and at least one extra-judicial execution.” In particular, Russia has arrested leaders
of the Crimean Tatars, a minority group in Crimea, that have spoken out against the illegal Russian occupation. The U.N.
report found that Russia “has infringed on the civil, political, and cultural rights of Crimean Tatars.”
Russia in violation of the INF Treaty
Russia is in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which bans missiles with ranges between 500
kilometers and 5,500 kilometers. In 2014, the United States accused Russia of being in violation of the treaty. The United
States and NATO are pressuring Russia to return to compliance with the treaty, as their failure to do so could spark a
dangerous arms race. While Russia is in violation of the INF treaty, it has remained compliant with the New START treaty.
Russian military operating dangerously and provocatively
Russia’s military posture toward the United States and NATO is adversarial. As tensions have increased, especially after
Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, there have been an increasing number of dangerous and provocative air and
sea incidents instigated by Russian military forces. Furthermore, Russia’s military posture and military exercises are often
directed against the United States and its allies, just as those of the United States and NATO are often directed against
Russia. This further demonstrates that both Russia and NATO operate militarily as strategic adversaries. Reflecting this
reality, the commander of U.S. European Command and the supreme allied commander of Europe, General Curtis
Scaparrotti, testified to Congress in early May, saying, “EUCOM has shifted its focus from security cooperation and
engagement to deterrence and defense … we are returning to our historic role as a warfighting command.”
Dangerous incidents between U.S. and Russian planes and ships are increasing
Fox reported that there were more than 35 encounters between U.S. and Russian planes and ships in June. On June 21,
2016, a Russian fighter jet, a Su-27 Flanker, flew within 5 feet of a U.S. Air Force reconnaissance plane in international waters
over the Baltic Sea. U.S. European Command called the Russia’s actions “provocative” and “unsafe."
Russia violating airspace of NATO members as well as neutral states. Russian fighter jets have repeatedly violated the air
space of Baltic and Nordic countries. Sweden summoned Russia’s ambassador following a Russian fighter jet flying very
close to a Swedish reconnaissance plane in international airspace over the Baltic. On June 21, a Russian plane flying with
the Russian defense minister was flying with its transponders off, prompting a response from Polish NATO planes, which in
turn prompted a Russian fighter jet to respond as well. Defense Minister for Finland Jussi Niinistö explained, “We take these
incidents seriously … Having two suspected violations on the same day is exceptional.”
Russia operating recklessly, flying with transponders off. The chairman of NATO’s military command, General Petr Pavel,
explained, “We are mostly witnessing what we call unprofessional behavior in the airspace. When these rules are broken the
chance of getting into an incident is pretty close.”
Russia’s military orientating to combat and counter the United States and NATO
Russia has modernized its military and has built up its capabilities to counter NATO forces. Russia has turned the Russian
territory of Kaliningrad, an enclave on the Baltic between Poland and Lithuania, into a military battle station. Russia has
deployed nuclear capable Iskander-M missiles that have a range of 500 kilometers, which means it can target NATO facilities
as well as a number of major NATO cities, such as Berlin. Moscow has also deployed its advanced S-400 anti-aircraft system
and the P-800 Oniks, a supersonic, anti-ship cruise missile. These armaments would hinder any NATO effort to support the
Baltic states in a conflict and pose a threat to alliance activities in the Baltic Sea. According to Sergey Sukhankin in a
commentary for the European Council on Foreign Relations, “The intensity with which Russia has militarised the oblast in
recent years has dispelled any remaining illusions about Kaliningrad becoming a bridge of cooperation with the West.”
Russia is also conducting military exercises and war games designed to counter NATO forces. The recent Zapad exercise in
Belarus, as Chatham House characterized, “[L]ooked like a dress rehearsal for defending against a NATO intervention. This
is what Russia wants the West to believe is the Kremlin’s understanding of what a conventional war between Russia and
NATO forces would look like.”
Russia acting against U.S. interests and international stability worldwide
A key objective of Russian foreign policy is to undermine U.S. interests and U.S. global leadership.
Russia militarily intervened on behalf of the regime of Bashar Al-Assad, which had used chemical weapons and carried out
war crimes against its own citizens. Russia’s intervention turned the tide of the conflict, contributing to a massive refugee and
humanitarian crisis and assuring the survival of the brutal regime. Former head of U.S. European Command and the
supreme allied commander of Europe, General Philip Breedlove, said Russia and Assad were “deliberately weaponising
migration in an attempt to overwhelm European structures and break European resolve.” Furthermore, Russia’s intervention
has done little to counter the Islamic State, which was the major focus of the U.S.-led coalition’s military intervention.
Russia is undercutting the sanctions regime. The Washington Post reports that Russian smugglers are shipping fuel and
other vital goods that will help soften the blow of sanctions. The increase in shipping traffic even prompted the creation of a
dedicated ferry line between the North Korea ports of Rajin and Vladivostok early the summer. Russia also continues to use
cheap North Korean laborers and has worked with China to water down the U.N. sanctions against North Korea.
Russian efforts in the Balkans seek to erode democratic institutions and turn these countries away from the European Union
and the United States. For instance, Russia is suspected of being involved in the recent failed coup in Montenegro and for
supporting radical leaders in the region.
Russia is an ally and backer of the Maduro regime in Venezuela and is providing it with vital “cash and credit,” which is
essentially keeping the regime afloat.
According to the U.S. military and the U.S. State Department, Russia has been providing arms to the Taliban, which the U.S.-
led NATO coalition is combatting. Reuters reported that a senior U.S. official indicated “the supply of weapons has
accelerated in the past 18 months.”
The post-Cold War strategy of seeking to integrate Russia into the liberal global order is no longer operable. Russia under
Putin will continue to position itself as a geopolitical adversary of the United States. The United States needs to reset its
posture toward Russia to recognize that it now confronts a global ideological competition not seen since the Cold War. As
such, it is critical that the Trump administration and congressional lawmakers take action to both deter Russia’s aggressive
behavior and to protect the United States and its allies from further attacks.
After 9/11, knowing the threat from terrorism would be all-consuming, Congress established the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security and implemented a whole host of reforms to improve the U.S. government’s defenses. After the voting
issues surrounding the 2000 election, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act in 2002, which allocated $3.65 billion to
improve America’s voting systems.130 Yet, currently, little is being done despite Russia’s intervention in the 2016 election.
Congress and the White House have not acted to protect America from the clear threat posed by Russia. The following are
actions and approaches that the Trump administration and Congress should take.
The White House and Congress must stop efforts to appease Moscow
The first step in addressing the challenge posed by Russia’s hostile actions is to stop pretending that they are not occurring.
President Trump continues to cast doubt on the assessments of the U.S. intelligence community and, along with his
secretary of state, resist efforts to address them. The Republican-led Congress has not called out the White House for its
efforts to appease the Kremlin nor has it prioritized this challenge. The muddled messages from Washington are likely
interpreted as a green light for Russia to advance its efforts. Instead, the White House and Congress must send a clear
message to Russia that efforts to undermine America and its allies will be countered strongly.
Protect America’s elections from foreign cyberattacks
According to a report by CAP’s Michael Sozan, protecting America’s election system could cost as little as $1.25 billion over a
10-year period—a fraction of previous election infrastructure reforms. The price tag for securing America’s elections would
require just $1 billion to update outdated voting machines; $5 million per year to conduct threat assessments for voter
registration databases; and $20 million per year to conduct nationwide risk-limiting audits for federal elections. There is
bipartisan legislation in the Senate, introduced by Sens. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) and Lindsey Graham (R-SC), and the House
of Representatives, introduced by Reps. Jim Langevin (D-RI) and Mark Meadows (R-NC), that would take major steps to
address the threat. Yet Majority Leader McConnell and Speaker Ryan have currently blocked this legislation from even
receiving a vote.
Aggressively implement U.S. sanctions against Russia
Congress must ensure that the Trump administration aggressively implements the new sanctions legislation, which could
cause a severe blow to the Russian energy and defense sectors. For instance, reports that Saudi Arabia has agreed to
purchase a Russian air defense system for an estimate of $2 billion dollars could make the Saudis subject to U.S. sanctions.
Should Saudi Arabia follow through on this deal, the United States should be prepared to levy sanctions against the Saudi
Bolster U.S. intelligence and cyberdefense capabilities to better cope with Russia
The United States needs to bolster the intelligence resources and assets devoted to monitoring Russia, especially in
countering Russian intelligence efforts against the United States and its allies. Since 9/11, counterterrorism has appropriately
been the priority. However, given the escalation of Russian influence and espionage efforts, more resources and personnel
need to be devoted to countering Russian espionage within the United States. Congress must properly resource these efforts
and ensure that investigations into Russian intervention continue. Additionally, the United States needs to take urgent steps to
ensure the security of its cyberweapons and to combat Russian cybercriminals.
Stand up for democracy and human rights
Combating the Kremlin is fundamentally about the highest levels of the U.S. government standing up in support of freedom
and democracy around the world. Unfortunately, the Trump administration not only has failed to speak up for democracy and
human rights but has also actively sought to undermine these values and what America stands for. It is bending over
backward to accommodate and offer support to authoritarian governments and strongman rulers.133 Moreover, Trump’s
attack on the press; Secretary Tillerson’s unwillingness to allow the press to travel with him; and rhetoric about locking up
political opponents cause tremendous damage to the moral authority of the United States and serve to weaken America’s
ability to lead.134 When the leader of the free world no longer values democracy, these principles are weakened worldwide.
Hold social media companies accountable
Russian operatives and troll farms are exploiting their access to U.S. social media to conduct information operations on their
platforms. These social media companies are not doing enough to stop Russian efforts. Congress must hold these
companies accountable, including through regulations and legislation that ensure these platforms are transparent to their
users, protect user information and data, and are not serving as vehicles for public manipulation and disinformation.
Congress should immediately move to pass the “Honest Ads Act,” which would require online political advertising on social
media companies to have a similar level of transparency as ads broadcast by television and radio stations.
The United States should take action against money laundering
The Unites States should introduce policies aimed at curtailing systemic money laundering through anonymous purchases of
domestic real estate. The banking and financial services industry can be used as a model, as they are mandated to report any
suspicious transactions to law enforcement and have in place anti-money laundering controls, which have proven effective in
detecting and preventing the use of lending institutions to facilitate the laundering of ill-gotten gains. The Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) of the Treasury Department has already made steps in the right direction with the introduction
of the geographic targeting orders that have temporarily required U.S. title insurance companies to identify the ultimate
beneficiaries behind shell companies used to pay “all cash” for high-end residential real estate in several U.S. risk-prone
jurisdictions, including New York and Miami. What’s more, the United States should take steps to crack down on the use of
shell companies as vehicles for money laundering, particularly in the state of Delaware, where limited reporting requirements
allow individuals, including foreign nationals, to set up anonymous shell companies without listing directors or shareholders.
The intrinsic anonymity of shell companies makes them a favored means by which to facilitate the laundering of money on a
Block Secretary Tillerson’s efforts to undermine U.S. diplomacy
To counter Russian efforts around the world, the United States needs a robust State Department and diplomatic corps to get
the rest of the world to follow the lead of the United States and adopt policies that isolate Russia. Congress should use all
available leverage points it has to block Secretary Tillerson’s efforts to downsize and deconstruct the State Department. For
instance, Congress can indefinitely hold all arms sales until the secretary of state properly staffs his agency. Congress
should also explore whether Secretary Tillerson is in violation of the impoundment act, which prohibits any administration
from unilaterally implementing proposed budget cuts without approval from Congress.
Bolster defense assets in Europe
The Department of Defense should ensure that Europe remains a priority for critical defense assets that can ensure that the
United States and NATO can deter Russian aggression. The Pentagon should continue to take steps to ensure that U.S.
forces remain at the tip of the spear in NATO deployments by ensuring robust U.S. force deployments to NATO’s east and
south. The presence of U.S. forces could complicate Russian efforts to instigate a crisis. The Pentagon should also continue
to prioritize the deployment to the European theater assets with high-deterrent value, such as F-22 fighters, and bolster
maritime assets in the Baltic and Black seas.
Establish an Eastern European Security Assistance Initiative
Congress should establish an Eastern European Security Assistance Initiative through the State Department to help these
countries transition from Russian military equipment without sacrificing short-term military readiness. Congress should help
Eastern European states end their reliance on Russian equipment by providing a mix of financing and direct assistance to
facilitate expensive fighter and helicopter acquisitions, just as the Bush administration did to help Poland procure F-16s in
2002.139 Currently, countries, such as Bulgaria, are balancing expensive fighter acquisitions with maintaining short-term
readiness. Congress should help these allies bolster their forces.
Maintain areas where there is useful cooperation with Russia and maintain a dialogue to avoid an escalatory trap
While Russia must be confronted, there are also areas where cooperation is both possible and in U.S. national interests.
Russia, for instance, continues to implement the New START Treaty, which reduces Russian and U.S. nuclear arsenals and
delivery vehicles. This treaty is in U.S. national security interests, so while Russia may violate other agreements, where it is in
compliance and where it is in U.S. interests to continue, the United States should do so. Additionally, the United States and
Russia should continue to maintain regular diplomatic contact. Russia shrinking the size of the U.S. diplomatic presence as
retaliation against U.S. sanctions was done more out of weakness than strength, as Russia has few ways to overtly respond
to the United States.
Fight the information war by significantly expanding public diplomacy efforts
As the United States cut funding for public diplomacy efforts after the Cold War, Russia—as well as countries such as Iran
and China—significantly expanded funding of state-supported media. Meanwhile, many Western news networks decided it
was not profitable enough to invest in foreign language media in small markets such as the Balkans. Russia has sought to
fill this gap in the news media marketplace through the expansion of Russian-state funded media. Many of the local media
environments are increasingly Russian-dominated—where anti-U.S., anti-NATO, anti-EU, and anti-democratic messages
carry the day. The United States needs to support and expand efforts to provide an independent alternative to Russian
disinformation. Doing so requires significant expansion in funding efforts for U.S.-sponsored outlets such as Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America, which are funded by the United States but governed by the Broadcasting Board of
Governors. These efforts, however, remain woefully underfunded and fall short of what is needed to challenge Russian-
backed media, which has become entrenched in many countries. Congress should also ensure the Global Engagement
Center (GEC) is resourced and empowered to counter Russian disinformation. While congress has authorized a significant
increase in the GEC budget and expanded its mandate, Secretary Tillerson has resisted these efforts.
Deter state-sponsored cyberattacks by sending clear message about U.S. cyber redlines
The United States needs to establish boundaries and deterrence in cyberspace through the clear messaging of U.S. cyber
redlines and by loudly calling out cyberintrusions. Developing clear messages and redlines about what the United States
would deem to be a cyberattack under the law of war could decrease ambiguity and help deter such attacks against America.
Indeed, President Obama privately confronted Putin at the G-20 summit in China and warned him that hacking the voting
systems would cross the line and merit a strong retaliatory response. The United States should more clearly articulate
sectors that it believes should be off limits to a cyberattack and warn that if these sectors are deemed to be under attack—
such as interference in an election or an attack on critical infrastructure—the United States will respond forcefully.
Russia’s attacks on American democracy and its efforts to undermine the United States and its allies have not stopped.
Russia’s actions are those of an adversary—not an ally or partner. It is delusional and harmful to the security of the United
States for the Trump administration to continue to appease the Kremlin. The United States should not contemplate a new
partnership or alliance with Russia without a clear and significant change in Russian behavior. While the Kremlin has shifted
back to a Cold War-footing, the United States under President Trump has no coherent or unified approach. Congress has
also done little and must take action now to improve America’s defenses and protect U.S. democracy. Russia did not end its
efforts to undermine American democracy with the 2016 election. The United States must prepare itself for the future attacks
that are inevitably coming in the 2018 election.
About the authors
Max Bergmann is a senior fellow at American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From
2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the
secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to
the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior
adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at
American Progress as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy
director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his
bachelor’s degree from Bates College.
Carolyn Kenney is a policy analyst with the National Security and International Policy team at the Center